EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Evenwel, Voting Power, and Dual Districting

Paul H. Edelman

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2016, vol. 45, issue 1, 203 - 221

Abstract: I show that it is always possible to draw legislative districts that would be close in both total population and citizen voting-age population (or, indeed, any pair of populations that is desired). Thus, the Supreme Court need not choose between equalizing representation and equalizing voting power as it was asked to do in Evenwel v. Abbott. By example, I show that requiring equality of both total population and citizen voting-age population may, however, force the dilution of minority votes. Some of my analysis depends on how the Court chooses to assess the deviation in voting power. I derive the relationship between the deviation of voting power and the deviation of voting populations and show that the standard of 10 percent deviation in voting populations leads to a deviation of less than 10 percent in voting power over a broad range of models.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/684834 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/684834 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/684834

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Legal Studies from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/684834