Harmful, Harmless, and Beneficial Uncertainty in Law

Scott Baker and Alex Raskolnikov

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2017, vol. 46, issue 2, 281 - 307

Abstract: This article examines the impact of four types of law-related uncertainty on the utility of risk-neutral agents. We find that greater legal or factual uncertainty makes agents worse off if enforcement is targeted (which means that greater deviations from what the law demands lead to a greater probability of enforcement) or if sanctions are graduated (which means that greater deviations from what the law demands result in higher sanctions). In contrast, agents are indifferent to changes in uncertainty about detection induced by variation in enforcement resources or to changes in uncertainty about sanctions arising from legally irrelevant factors. Finally, risk-neutral agents benefit from greater legal uncertainty if they act only on preapproval by a cautious regulator. Our findings shed light on policy debates about the appropriate specificity of legal standards, the reform of corporate criminal liability, and the government's reluctance to clarify the details of tax law and tax enforcement.

Date: 2017
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