Global Reputation for Guest Workers

Moran Sadeh

The Journal of Legal Studies, 2018, vol. 47, issue S1, S247 - S269

Abstract: This article proposes a reputation mechanism that simultaneously addresses two central challenges in temporary-migration programs--information and incentives. With this reputation mechanism, guest workers' behavior and performance in each host country are recorded and scored in a global repository. Positive reputation acquired in one country can then be used for further admission options among multiple participating host countries over a longer period of time. The shift to a repeat-game framework takes place on the global level without compromising the interest of host government in the transience of its guest workers. By utilizing accumulated information, the reputation mechanism improves screening and enforcement processes and allows the implementation of less punitive domestic programs. The power of reputation can also be utilized to monitor employers' behavior, thus providing better information for workers and incentivizing self-regulation by employers.

Date: 2018
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