Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit

Bo Cowgill and Patryk Perkowski

Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 2024, vol. 2, issue 4, 852 - 882

Abstract: Firms increasingly delegate job screening to third-party recruiters. Recruiters must not only satisfy employers’ demand for different types of candidates but also manage yield by anticipating candidates’ likelihood of accepting offers. We study how recruiters balance these objectives in a novel, two-sided field experiment. We find that workers discriminate using the race and gender of the employer’s leaders more than employers discriminate against the candidate's race and gender. Black and female candidates face particularly high uncertainty, as their callback rates vary widely across employers. Callback decisions place about two-thirds weight on employer’s expected behavior and one-third on yield management.

Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit (2024)
Working Paper: Delegation in Hiring: Evidence from a Two-Sided Audit (2024)
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