Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis

Yaron Azrieli, Christopher Chambers and Paul J. Healy

Journal of Political Economy, 2018, vol. 126, issue 4, 1472 - 1503

Abstract: Experimental economists currently lack a convention for how to pay subjects in experiments with multiple tasks. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this question. Assuming statewise monotonicity and nothing else, we prove that paying for one randomly chosen problem--the random problem selection mechanism--is essentially the only incentive compatible mechanism. Paying for every period is similarly justified when we assume only a "no complementarities at the top" condition. To help experimenters decide which is appropriate for their particular experiment, we discuss empirical tests of these two assumptions.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (169)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/698136 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/698136 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives in Experiments: A Theoretical Analysis (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/698136

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().