The Political Economy of Weak Treaties

Marco Battaglini and Bard Harstad

Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 128, issue 2, 544 - 590

Abstract: In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelection. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are “weak,” in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also show that political economy considerations lead to overambitious treaties that rely too much on technology instead of sanctions to motivate compliance. Our theory can rationalize several puzzles associated with treaties.

Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Weak Treaties (2016)
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Weak Treaties (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/704610

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