Collusion in Markets with Syndication

John William Hatfield, Scott Kominers, Richard Lowery and Jordan M. Barry

Journal of Political Economy, 2020, vol. 128, issue 10, 3779 - 3819

Abstract: Many markets are syndicated, including those for initial public offerings, club deal leveraged buyouts, and debt issuances; in such markets, each winning bidder invites competitors to join a syndicate to complete production. We show that in syndicated markets, collusion may become easier as market concentration falls and market entry may facilitate collusion. In particular, firms can sustain collusion by refusing to syndicate with any firm that undercuts the collusive price, thereby raising that firm’s production costs. Our results can thus rationalize the paradoxical empirical observations that many real-world syndicated markets exhibit seemingly collusive pricing despite low levels of market concentration.

Date: 2020
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