Estimating an Auction Platform Game with Two-Sided Entry

Marleen Marra

Journal of Political Economy, 2025, vol. 133, issue 6, 1932 - 1974

Abstract: This paper develops and estimates a structural auction platform model with endogenous entry of buyers and sellers to study the welfare impacts of fee changes. Estimates from a new wine auction dataset illustrate the striking feature of two-sided markets that some users can be made better off despite paying higher fees. The results also underscore the importance of addressing seller selection when endogenizing (buyer) entry onto auction platforms. Quantifying the welfare effects from (anticompetitive) fee changes through a model that accounts for important user interactions enables antitrust policy to be applied to such markets.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/734722 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/734722 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/734722

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().