Quota Mechanisms: Finite-Sample Optimality and Robustness

Ian Ball and Deniz Kattwinkel

Journal of Political Economy, 2026, vol. 134, issue 10, 3138 - 3192

Abstract: A quota mechanism, such as a mandatory grading curve, links together multiple decisions. We analyze the performance of quota mechanisms when the number of linked decisions is finite and the designer has imperfect knowledge of the type distribution. Using a new optimal transport approach, we derive an ex post decision error guarantee for quota mechanisms. This guarantee cannot be improved by any mechanisms without transfers. We quantify the sensitivity of quota mechanisms to errors in the designer’s estimate of the type distribution. Finally, we show that quotas are robust to a range of agents’ beliefs about each other.

Date: 2026
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