Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members

Pierre-Guillaume Méon

ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles

Date: 2006-09
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in: Constitutional Political Economy (2006) v.17 n° 3,p.207-216

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2006)
Working Paper: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: the whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2006)
Working Paper: Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/8364

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://hdl.handle.ne ... .ulb.ac.be:2013/8364

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ULB Institutional Repository from ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Benoit Pauwels ().