Collective Values, Behavioural Norms, and Rules: Building Institutions for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction

Ke-Young Chu

No DP2001-98, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Economic growth and poverty reduction require for a country to establish efficient rules for economic and political transactions. Poor countries suffer from inadequate, inefficient transaction rules. Formal rules (e.g., laws, policies) must be nested in hospitable behavioural norms and values. Cultural collectivism in many of these countries and consequent group-oriented values, factionalism, and discretionary rule implementation have adverse implications for their efforts to establish well-defined property rights and other rules.

Keywords: Economic growth; Game theory; Institutional economics; Poverty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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