Formalizing clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund

Ken Ochieng' Opalo

No wp-2021-147, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Why does clientelism persist? What determines how politicians signal responsiveness or fulfil their campaign promises? Existing works assume that politicians choose the most successful means of winning votes—either through targeted patronage/clientelism or programmatic policies. However, the empirical record shows high levels of persistence of the nature of the relationship between voters and politicians. Both politicians and voters are not always able to unilaterally change what campaign promises are achievable and therefore deemed credible.

Keywords: Politics; Kenya; Clientelism; Politician; Voting behaviour; Reforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-147

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