Silent citizens: political corruption and tax disclosure

Abhinav Khemka and Claudia Serra-Sala

No wp-2025-114, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: We investigate how political corruption affects citizens' willingness to disclose tax evasion. We conducted a survey experiment with 1,200 respondents in Bangalore, India, combining corruption vignettes and list experiments. Respondents were randomly presented with hypothetical candidates whose attributes varied along three dimensions: (a) alleged honesty versus corruption; (b) prioritization of infrastructure versus other public spending; and (c) political party affiliation.

Keywords: Corruption; Tax evasion; List experiment; India; Voting behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-iue
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