Criminal revenue, civic returns: how illicit taxation boosts electoral participation

Jessie Trudeau

No wp-2025-86, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: How does criminal group taxation affect participation in elections? I argue that criminal groups that tax public service provision use it as a technology of governance, which gives them a comparative advantage in voter mobilization. I predict that higher levels of criminal taxes on services ultimately lead to higher levels of voter participation, and contrast the service provision mechanism with other mechanisms related to coercive taxation and bottom-up reactions to being taxed.

Keywords: Crime; Taxation; Governance; Voter turnout; Political participation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-soc
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