Child Control in Education Decisions: An Evaluation of Targeted Incentives to Learn in India

James Berry

Journal of Human Resources, 2015, vol. 50, issue 4, 1051-1080

Abstract: I report the results of a field experiment in Gurgaon, India that offered cash and noncash incentives to learn either to children or to their parents. While I find no evidence that the identity of the recipient or form of the reward mattered in the aggregate, noncash incentives targeted to children were more effective for initially low-performing children while cash incentives were more effective for high-performing children. To explore the mechanisms behind this result, I present a model of household education production and find additional empirical results consistent with the model.

Date: 2015
Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.50.4.1051
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

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