Optimum Fishing Capacity and International Transfer of Excess Allowable Catches

Rögnvaldur Hannesson

Land Economics, 1994, vol. 70, issue 3, 330-344

Abstract: This paper considers optimum fleet capacity for fish stocks that vary randomly and are managed by separate states. Assigning a particular fleet to a particular stock will be less profitable than allowing fleets to move between stocks. Transfer of excess catch quotas between states improves profitability, but produces a global optimum only if payments are attached to the transfer. A free transfer of excess quotas results in overcapacity and dissipation of rents. A Nash bargaining solution with respect to transfer prices, but without side payments, gives solutions very close to the global optimum.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3146533
A subscription is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwp:landec:v:70:y:1994:i:3:p:330-344

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Land Economics from University of Wisconsin Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().