Contestable Licensing

Zvika Neeman () and Gerhard O. Orosel ()
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Gerhard O. Orosel: https://econ.univie.ac.at

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing - a franchisee halds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another firm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not verifiable, the simple regulatory scheme we describe combines market-like incentives with regulatory oversight to generate efficient outcomes.

JEL-codes: D42 D45 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie0004

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