Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field

Ana Ania

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results highlight the complexity of learning by imitation of successful behavior displayed by conspecifics in the presence of strategic considerations within the same population.

JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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