The Effect of Litigation on Intellectual Property and Welfare

Julio Robledo

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper shows that “wasteful” litigation about intellectual property may be welfare enhancing. The aim of an intellectual property protection system is to solve the trade-off between ex-ante innovation incentive and ex-post monopoly welfare loss. The litigation about intellectual property in court decreases the expected rent from intellectual property, therefore reducing the incentive to innovate in the first place leading to a negative effect on social welfare. Yet the legal contest may have the positive welfare effect of breaking the monopoly and allowing an entrant into the market, thus lowering prices and reducing the welfare loss of monopoly. If the welfare effect of increasing competition outweighs the first effect of reduced research, a litigation contest is welfare increasing.

JEL-codes: K41 L13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
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