Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions

Christine Zulehner ()
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Christine Zulehner: https://econ.univie.ac.at

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: The objectives of this study are to investigate the institutional specifics of sequential cattle auctions and their role as determinants of prices. Institutional specifics are the order of sale according to quality, a secret reserve price, bidders' multi-unit demand and different types of bidders. Prices decline and bidders with a higher demand pay on average lower prices. The estimation results show that declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the secret reserve price. The results further show that bidders take the strategic effect of sequential auctions and multi-unit demand into account.

JEL-codes: D44 Q12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-09
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