Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Ecport Dynamics: Theory and Evidence from French Firms

Romain Aeberhardt (papers.econ@univie.ac.at), Ines Buono and Harald Fadinger
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Romain Aeberhardt: https://econ.univie.ac.at

Vienna Economics Papers from University of Vienna, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a model where exporting requires finding a local partner in each market. Contracts are incomplete and exporters must learn the reliability of their partners through experience. In the model, export behavior is state-dependent due to matching frictions, although there are no sunk costs. Better legal institutions alleviate contracting frictions especially in sectors with large contracting problems. Thus, measures of legal quality have a greater positive impact on state dependence and reduce hazard rates by more in those sectors that are more exposed to hold-up problems. Moreover, hazard rates decline with relation age, as unreliable partners are weeded out. We find strong evidence in favor of the model's predictions when testing them with a French dataset which includes information on firm-level exports by destination country.

JEL-codes: F12 F14 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
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https://papersecon.univie.ac.at/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1006.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Learning, incomplete contracts and export dynamics: Theory and evidence from French firms (2014)
Working Paper: Learning, incomplete contracts and export dynamics: theory and evidence from French firms (2012)
Working Paper: Learning, Incomplete Contracts and Export Dynamics: Theory and Evidence from French Firms (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vie:viennp:vie1006

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