When Doves Cry: International Rivalry, Unreciprocated Cooperation, and Leadership Turnover

Michael Colaresi

American Journal of Political Science, 2004, vol. 48, issue 3, 555-570

Abstract: Varied research traditions suggest that dovish leaders will be thrown out of office under harsh external circumstances. Below, I elaborate a model of rivalry maintenance that draws on and refines the insight from studies of leadership tenure and foreign policy. Specifically, I expect a leader who offers unreciprocated cooperation to a rival (a dove) to be more likely to be deselected from power than a leader that takes a harder line vis‐à‐vis the rival (a hawk). I test this expectation using event history techniques and data spanning the 1950–1990 time period and find strong evidence that dovish leaders pay an electoral price within a rivalry context. The findings suggest an internationally contingent domestic incentive to maintain rivalry and conflict over time.

Date: 2004
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00087.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:3:p:555-570

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