Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790

Joshua D. Clinton and Adam Meirowitz

American Journal of Political Science, 2004, vol. 48, issue 4, 675-689

Abstract: A difficult yet prevalent problem in legislative politics is how to assess explanations when observable actions may not represent true (and unobserved) legislator preferences. We present a method for analyzing the validity of theoretical/historical accounts that unifies theory, history, and measurement. We argue that approaches to testing accounts of legislative behavior which are theoretically and historically agnostic are not always best and present an approach which: (1) forms an explicit explanation of behavior (here a simple dynamic voting game) that yields estimable parameter constraints, and (2) tests these constraints using a customized empirical model that is as consistent as possible with the explanation. We demonstrate the method using legislative voting data from the first Congress (1789–1791). Using the idea of sophisticated equivalents from voting theory we subject the traditional account of the “Compromise of 1790” to a statistical test and find that there is reason to doubt the claim that legislators of the time believed the specified log roll was taking place. The results suggest that the capital location and assumption issues were resolved independently.

Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:675-689

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