Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote‐Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation

Matthew Søberg Shugart, Melody Ellis Valdini and Kati Suominen

American Journal of Political Science, 2005, vol. 49, issue 2, 437-449

Abstract: Proportional representation systems affect the extent to which elected legislators exhibit various attributes that allow them to earn a personal vote. The sources of variation in personal vote‐earning attributes (PVEA) lie in informational shortcuts voters use under different electoral rules. List type (closed or open) and district magnitude (the number of legislators elected from a district) affect the types of shortcuts voters employ. When lists are closed, legislators' PVEA are of decreasing usefulness to voters as magnitude (and hence the number of candidates on a list) increases. When lists are open, legislators' PVEA are increasingly useful to voters as magnitude increases, because the number of candidates from which voters must choose whom to give a preference vote increases. As predicted by the theory, the probability that a legislator will exhibit PVEA—operationalized as local birthplace or lower‐level electoral experience—declines with magnitude when lists are closed, but rises with magnitude when lists are open.

Date: 2005
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00133.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:437-449

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