Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal Points

Nils Ringe

American Journal of Political Science, 2005, vol. 49, issue 4, 731-745

Abstract: This article introduces a model of policy preference formation in legislative politics. Emphasizing a dynamic relationship between structure, agent, and decision‐making process, it ties the question of policy choice to the dimensionality of the normative and cognitive political space and the strategic actions of parliamentary agenda setters. The model proposes that structural factors, such as ideology, shape policy preferences to the extent that legislative actors successfully link them to specific policy proposals through the strategic provision of focal points. These ideas or images shift attention toward particular aspects of a legislative proposal, thus shaping the dominant interpretation of its content and consequences. This interpretation affects both individual‐level policy preferences and policy outcomes. The propositions of the focal‐point model are tested empirically in a detailed examination of European Union legislation on cross‐border takeover bids, using both qualitative and quantitative methods.

Date: 2005
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00151.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:49:y:2005:i:4:p:731-745

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in American Journal of Political Science from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().