Clarity of Responsibility and Corruption

Margit Tavits

American Journal of Political Science, 2007, vol. 51, issue 1, 218-229

Abstract: This article demonstrates that political institutions influence the level of corruption via clarity of responsibility. The key hypothesis is that when political institutions provide high clarity of responsibility, politicians face incentives to pursue good policies and reduce corruption. These incentives are induced by the electorates' rejection of incumbents who do not provide satisfactory outcomes. However, if lines of responsibility are not clear, the ability of voters to evaluate and punish politicians—as well as to create incentives for performance—declines. The findings confirm that countries with institutions that allow for greater clarity of responsibility have lower levels of corruption.

Date: 2007
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00246.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:51:y:2007:i:1:p:218-229

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