Justice, Charity, and Disaster Relief: What, If Anything, Is Owed to Haiti, Japan, and New Zealand?

Laura Valentini

American Journal of Political Science, 2013, vol. 57, issue 2, 491-503

Abstract: Whenever fellow humans suffer due to natural catastrophes, we have a duty to help them. This duty is not only acknowledged in moral theory but also expressed in ordinary people's reactions to phenomena such as tsunamis, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Despite being widely acknowledged, this duty is also widely disputed: some believe it is a matter of justice, others a matter of charity. Although central to debates in international political theory, the distinction between justice and charity is hardly ever systematically drawn. To fill this gap in the literature, I consider three accounts of this distinction— the “agent‐based,” the “recipient‐based,” and the “mixed” view—and argue that they are all unsatisfactory. I then offer a fourth alternative, the “autonomy” view, which successfully overcomes the difficulties affecting its rivals. I conclude by considering the implications of this view for the moral grounds of disaster relief in earthquake‐stricken Haiti, New Zealand, and Japan.

Date: 2013
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00622.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:57:y:2013:i:2:p:491-503

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