Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability

Lucy Martin and Pia J. Raffler

American Journal of Political Science, 2021, vol. 65, issue 1, 210-224

Abstract: This article introduces a new explanation for why citizens may fail to vote based on government performance. We argue that when politicians have limited capacity to control bureaucrats, citizens will not know whether government performance is a good signal of the incumbent's quality. We develop a selection model of elections in which policy is jointly determined by a politician and a bureaucrat. When politicians have incomplete power over policy, elections perform worse at separating good and bad types of incumbents. We test the theory's predictions using survey experiments conducted with nearly 9,000 citizens and local officials in Uganda. We find that citizens and officials allocate more responsibility to politicians when they are perceived as having more power relative to bureaucrats. The allocation of responsibility has electoral consequences: When respondents believe that bureaucrats are responsible for performance, they are less likely to expect that government performance will affect incumbent vote share.

Date: 2021
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https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12530

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:amposc:v:65:y:2021:i:1:p:210-224

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