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Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviour, Parental Reputation and Strategic Transfers

Lingxin Hao, V. Joseph Hotz and Ginger Z. Jin

Economic Journal, 2008, vol. 118, issue 528, 515-555

Abstract: This article examines parental reputation formation in intra‐familial interactions. In a repeated two‐stage game, children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18. Drawing on Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that, under certain conditions, parents have the incentive to penalise older children for their adolescent risk‐taking behaviour in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviour when reaching adolescence. We find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model.

Date: 2008
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02132.x

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Journal Article: Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviour, Parental Reputation and Strategic Transfers (2008)
Working Paper: Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviors, Parental Reputation, and Strategic Transfers (2005) Downloads
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Economic Journal is currently edited by Estelle Cantillon, Martin Cripps, Andrea Galeotti, Morten Ravn, Kjell G. Salvanes, Frederic Vermeulen, Hans-Joachim Voth and Rachel Kranton

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