Revisiting the Classical View of Benefit‐based Taxation

Matthew Weinzierl ()

Economic Journal, 2018, vol. 128, issue 612, F37-F64

Abstract: This article incorporates into modern optimal tax theory the classical logic of benefit‐based taxation in which an individual's benefit from the activities of the state is tied to his or her income‐earning ability. First‐best optimal policy is characterised analytically as depending on a few potentially estimable statistics. Constrained optimal policy, with a Pareto‐efficient objective that trades off this principle and conventional utilitarianism, is simulated using conventional constraints and methods. A wide range of optimal policy outcomes can result, including those that match well several features of existing policies. This analysis thereby contributes to the theory of positive optimal taxation.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12462

Related works:
Working Paper: Revisiting the Classical View of Benefit-Based Taxation (2016)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Classical View of Benefit-Based Taxation (2014)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Classical View of Benefits-Based Taxation (2014)
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