Public investment and reelection prospects in developed countries

Margarita Katsimi and Vassilis Sarantides

Southern Economic Journal, 2015, vol. 82, issue 2, 471-500

Abstract: A growing body of literature suggests that office‐motivated politicians manipulate fiscal policy instruments to enhance their reelection prospects. This article directly examines the impact of fiscal policy on incumbents’ reelection prospects by focusing on the impact of public investment. This impact is estimated using a panel of 20 countries belonging in Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development over the period 1972–1999. We find that the level of public investment in the earlier years of an incumbent's term in office improves their reelection prospects, whereas election year manipulation of public investment is neither rewarded nor punished. Our evidence also suggests that, after controlling for the level of deficit and public investment, the level of government revenue both in the election and nonelection years does not seem to affect reelection prospects. Moreover, we find that deficit creation during elections and in nonelection years are not rewarded by voters.

Date: 2015
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https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2013.181

Related works:
Working Paper: Public Investment and Re-election Prospects in Developed Countries (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:soecon:v:82:y:2015:i:2:p:471-500

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