Riesgo Moral y Contratos: Cierta Evidencia Experimental

Julián Arévalo and Jair Ojeda-Joya
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Julián Arévalo: Universidad Externado de Colombia

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper shows one type of asymetric information problems, their theorethical implications, the design of contracts that mitigate them, as well as some experimental evidence. Furthermore, by extrapolating the results, the paper tries to illustrate certain macroeconomic implications obtained under a controlled environment.

Keywords: Moral Hazard; Contracts; Experimental Economics; Assymetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C90 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004-07-08, Revised 2004-07-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20
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Journal Article: Riesgo moral y contratos: cierta evidencia experimental (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0407002

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