Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

Paul Klemperer

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This is an Invited paper for the World Congress of the Econometric Society held in Seattle in August 2000. We discuss the strong connections between auction theory and "standard" economic theory, and argue that auction-theoretic tools and intuitions can provide useful arguments and insights in a broad range of mainstream economic settings that do not, at first sight, look like auctions. We also discuss some more obvious applications, especially to industrial organization.

Keywords: Auctions; Bidding; Auction Theory; Private Values; Common Values; Mechanism Design; Litigation; Stock Markets; Queues; Financial Crashes; Brand Loyalty; War of Attrition; Bertrand; Perfect Competition; E-Commerce; Spectrum Auctions; Treasury Auctions; Electricity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A C7 C9 D6 D7 D8 G H J K L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51 pages
Date: 2000-09-13
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on PC; pages: 51; figures: included
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Why every Economist should Learn some Auction Theory (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0004009

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