Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining

Saku Aura

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies a married couple's dynamic investment and consumption choices under the assumption that the couple cannot commit across time not to renegotiate their decisions. The inefficiencies that can arise are characterized. Efficiency properties of different divorce asset- division regimes are examined. A stylized common-law regime is shown to lead to fully efficient outcome in a simple model while it is shown that under a community-property regime the couple is unlikely to attain full efficiency. The effect of the inability to commit across time on the savings level is examined under a tractable special case of the model.

Keywords: Marital Bargaining; Dynamic Models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D10 D91 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2003-04-04
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on PC; pages: 31; figures: none
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/mic/papers/0304/0304002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining (2002)
Working Paper: Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital Bargaining (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0304002

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