Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria

Carlos Alós-Ferrer

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2003, vol. 05, issue 03, 263-290

Abstract: This paper examines the stability of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of symmetric games, viewed as population profiles in dynamical systems with learning within a single, finite population. Alternative models of imitation and myopic best reply are considered under different assumptions on the speed of adjustment. It is found that two specific refinements of mixed Nash equilibria identify focal rest points of these dynamics in general games. The relationship between both concepts is studied. In the2×2case, both imitation and myopic best reply yield strong stability results for the same type of mixed Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; imitation dynamics; best reply dynamics; learning; JEL classification code: C72; C73; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria (2000)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001057

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