EMPLOYMENT BY LOTTO REVISITED
Bettina Klaus () and
Flip Klijn
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009, vol. 11, issue 02, 181-198
Abstract:
We studyemployment by lotto(Aldershofet al., 1999), a procedurally fair matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershofet al.'s (1999) analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto in terms of a probabilistic serial dictatorship on the set of stable matchings. Second, we show that Aldershofet al.'s (1999) conjectures are correct for small matching markets but not necessarily correct for large matching markets.
Keywords: Employment by lotto; probabilistic mechanism; two-sided matching; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0219198909002248
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Working Paper: Employment by Lotto Revisited (2006) 
Working Paper: Employment by Lotto Revisited (2006) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:n:s0219198909002248
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198909002248
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