Self-Governance and the Effects of Rules in Irrigation Systems: Evidence from Laboratory and Framed Field Experiments in China, India and Vietnam

Lan T. Pham, Ilona M. Otto and Dimitrios Zikos
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Lan T. Pham: Faculty of Life Sciences, Division of Resource Economics, Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institute of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany†Faculty of Economics and Rural Development, Department of Resource and Environmental Economics, Vietnam National University of Agriculture, Trauquy Commune, Gialam District, Hanoi, Vietnam
Ilona M. Otto: #x2021;Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Climate Impacts and Vulnerabilities, Telegraphenberg A51, 14473 Potsdam, Germany
Dimitrios Zikos: Faculty of Life Sciences, Division of Resource Economics, Albrecht Daniel Thaer-Institute of Agricultural and Horticultural Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany

Water Economics and Policy (WEP), 2019, vol. 05, issue 01, 1-28

Abstract: This paper employs laboratory and framed field experiments to investigate factors influencing the behavior of irrigation users, with an emphasis on the effects of exogenously and endogenously designed allocation rules. The experiments were conducted with 36 groups of farmers and students from China, India and Vietnam. The results show that physically asymmetric access to water as a resource creates an asymmetric distribution of investments, harvests and revenues that favors upstream users. Exogenously designed allocation rules appear able to equalize the distribution of revenue between upstream and downstream users, but are also likely to reduce the volume of investment and generated revenue. Meanwhile, communication between irrigation users with the possibility of endogenously designed rules appears to have a stronger equalizing effect on asymmetric resource access but also increases overall investment, which then increases water availability in a hypothetical irrigation channel. This suggests that promoting participation of irrigation users in designing rules for water distribution, water use monitoring and sanctioning might improve the performance of irrigation systems.

Keywords: Asymmetric access; irrigation; allocation rules; behavioral experiment; endogeneity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1142/S2382624X18500091

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