Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Innovation and Diffusion of Water-Saving Technology

Lianyan Xu, Dechun Huang, Zhengqi He and Jie Cao
Additional contact information
Lianyan Xu: Business School of Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China2Collaborative innovation center of “World Water Valley“ and Water Ecological, Civilization, Nanjing 211100, P .R. China3Institute of Industrial Economics, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China
Dechun Huang: Business School of Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China2Collaborative innovation center of “World Water Valley“ and Water Ecological, Civilization, Nanjing 211100, P .R. China3Institute of Industrial Economics, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China
Zhengqi He: Business School of Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China2Collaborative innovation center of “World Water Valley“ and Water Ecological, Civilization, Nanjing 211100, P .R. China3Institute of Industrial Economics, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China
Jie Cao: Business School of Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China2Collaborative innovation center of “World Water Valley“ and Water Ecological, Civilization, Nanjing 211100, P .R. China3Institute of Industrial Economics, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, P. R. China

Water Economics and Policy (WEP), 2023, vol. 09, issue 04, 1-29

Abstract: Water resources are indispensable strategic primary resources for sustainable social development. To solve the water shortage problem, promoting the innovation and diffusion of water-saving technology is the key to improvement. In contrast, governmental regulation is a necessary means to promote the innovation of water-saving technology. This study builds a game model with the involvement of governments and businesses. The objective of the game model is to simulate the performance of imposing a tax or a subsidy to promote water-saving technology. In addition, this study introduces the bionic model Lotka–Volterra to investigate the diffusion process of water-saving technology by simulating the performance of the growth rate and competition coefficient. To explain this process more scientifically and intuitively, this paper uses MATLAB to simulate it. The results show that (i) when the subsidy coefficient is between 0.6 and 0.7, the enthusiasm of the government and enterprises to participate in innovating water-saving technology is high; (ii) when the tax penalty coefficient is higher than 0.8, it can not only motivate governmental control but also promote the innovation of enterprises’ water-saving technology; and (iii) the final equilibrium of the diffusion of water-saving technology is irrelevant to the growth rate in the long term, but it is closely related to the competition coefficient. Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward some relevant political suggestions to promote the innovation and diffusion of water-saving technology, such as reasonably increasing the water resources tax and government subsidies.

Keywords: Water-saving technology; evolutionary game; Lotka–Volterra model; technological innovation and diffusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S2382624X2340009X
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsi:wepxxx:v:09:y:2023:i:04:n:s2382624x2340009x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.1142/S2382624X2340009X

Access Statistics for this article

Water Economics and Policy (WEP) is currently edited by Ariel Dinar

More articles in Water Economics and Policy (WEP) from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Tai Tone Lim ().