Bayesian Persuasion

Matthew Gentzkow and Emir Kamenica
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Matthew Gentzkow: Stanford University, USA
Emir Kamenica: University of Chicago, USA

in World Scientific Books from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: This volume brings together the collected contributions of Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica, and several coauthors on the theme of Bayesian Persuasion.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion; Economic Theory; Information Economics; Information Design; Disclosure; Game Theory; Strategic Communication; Disclosure Regulation; Persuasion Games; Political Economy; Economic Behavior; Information Revelation; Collusion; Competition; Congestion; Manipulation of Beliefs; Rating Systems; Optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C01 C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
ISBN: 9789819802975
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https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/14088 (text/html)
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Chapters in this book:

Ch 1 Bayesian Persuasion , pp 1-38

Emir Kamenica and Matthew Gentzkow

Ch 7 Reducing Congestion Through Information Design , pp 165-176

Sanmay Das, Emir Kamenica and Renee Mirka

Ch 8 Suspense and Surprise , pp 177-232

Jeffrey Ely, Alexander Frankel and Emir Kamenica

Ch 9 Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design , pp 233-273

Emir Kamenica

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