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How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation

Gary Bolton (), Kalyan Chatterjee and Kathleen L. McGinn
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Kalyan Chatterjee: Department of Economics, Penn State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, USA
Kathleen L. McGinn: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, USA

Chapter 6 in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market:Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, 2013, pp 113-128 from World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Abstract: AbstractComplexity of communication is one of the important factors that distinguishes multilateral negotiation from its bilateral cousin. We investigate how the communication configuration affects a three-person coalition negotiation. Restricting who can communicate with whom strongly influences outcomes, and not always in ways that current theory anticipates. Competitive frictions, including a tendency to communicate offers privately, appear to shape much of what we observe. Our results suggest that parties with weaker alternatives would benefit from a more constrained structure, especially if they can be the conduit of communication, while those endowed with stronger alternatives would do well to work within a more public communication structure that promotes competitive bidding.

Keywords: Bilateral Bargaining; Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining; Political Negotiations; Multilateral Bargaining; Coalitional Bargaining; Arbitration; Dynamic Model of Negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Journal Article: How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation (2003) Downloads
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