Two kinds of political economy: Utility-individualism vs. choice-individualism

Viktor Vanberg

No 25/3, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.

Abstract: This paper contrasts two kinds of political economy, represented by welfare economics and social choice theory on the one hand and James M. Buchanan's constitutional political economy on the other hand. It posits that the difference between the two kinds has its roots in the different normative premises on which they are based, premises that I refer to as utility- or preference-individualism and choice-individualism respectively. And I show that, because of their different normative starting points, the two kinds of political economy pursue fundamentally different research agendas.

Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-pke and nep-upt
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