Influence in the Face of Impunity

Alexander Kritikos and Jonathan Tan

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2016, vol. 141, 119-121

Abstract: We compare dictator and impunity games. In impunity games, responders can reject offers but to no payoff consequence to proposers. Because proposers act under impunity, we should expect the same behavior across games, but experimentally observed behavior varies. Responders indeed exercise the rejection option. This threat psychologically influences proposers. Some proposers avoid rejection by offering nothing. Others raise offers, but only when they receive feedback from responders. Responders lose this influence in the absence of feedback.

Keywords: Dictator; Psychological influence; Experiment; Impunity; Guilt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Influence in the face of impunity (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:162877

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