Contesting the code: labor–management conflicts over AI adoption and the role of power resources under German codetermination

Martin Krzywdzinski and Philip Wotschack

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2026, issue Advance articles, 27 pages

Abstract: In the emerging literature on management–labor conflicts over AI implementation, two questions remain underexplored: how often such conflicts arise and what drives their emergence and outcomes? Drawing on power resources theory and strategic choice theory, this study addresses both questions by analyzing a survey of management representatives and works councils in 149 German companies. Conflicts center primarily on the implementation process of AI itself—involvement rights, trial phases, and expert access—rather than technology-specific issues like data protection and performance control. Strong institutional power resources of labor representatives (works council involvement and information access) reinforced by associational resources, significantly reduce conflict frequency by nudging management toward compromise-oriented strategies. However, once conflict arises, institutional and associational power resources lose their protective effect, and works councils report markedly diminished capacity to defend workers’ interests. This implies a balanced interpretation of the power of codetermination, recognizing its strengths but also limits.

Keywords: codetermination; collective bargaining; conflict; employee voice; industrial relations; power; technological change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 J52 J53 J83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:344477

DOI: 10.1093/ser/mwag047

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