An Analysis of the German Tenant Protection Law

Stefan Homburg

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 1993, vol. 149, issue 2, 464-474

Abstract: The article analyzes the welfare impact of Germany's tenant protection law. It shows why tenants do not demand protection in a market equilibrium, notwithstanding that moving expenses may be considerable. Under this assumption, tenant protection enforced by the law makes tenants worse off in the long run, whereas the number of actual evictions remains unchanged.

Keywords: Tenant protection; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K11 K36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:92900

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