Political economy of international sanctions
Jerg Gutmann,
Matthias Neuenkirch and
Florian Neumeier
No 81, ILE Working Paper Series from University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics
Keywords: International sanctions; political economy; public choice; rent seeking; trade; transaction costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F51 F53 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: Contribution prepared for the Elgar Encyclopedia of Public Choice
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Working Paper: Political Economy of International Sanctions (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ilewps:81
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