Designing rebate rules in public goods provision: Axioms, limits, and comparisons

Cyril Rouault and Resul Zoroglu

No 175, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: This paper examines rebate rules in the context of public goods provision. These rules aim to redistribute the surplus when total contributions exceed the cost of the project. Using an axiomatic approach, we establish impossibility results that highlight the inherent tensions between fairness, participation incentives, and contribution incentives. We then propose and characterize the Proportional Rebate with Threshold rule, which identifies a coherent trade-off across these objectives.

Keywords: Public goods provision; Crowdfunding; Axioms; Rebates; Fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D82 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ppm
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