Rethinking tobacco control: The global case for differentiated regulation of smoke-free alternatives

Doron Lavee and Florian Steidl

No 177, Working Paper Series in Economics from Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management

Abstract: Over the past years, governments have made substantial progress in tobacco control through higher taxes, advertising bans, and public smoking restrictions. Yet, in many advanced economies, smoking rates have stopped falling despite these strong measures. This stagnation suggests that traditional approaches, focused solely on discouraging all nicotine use, may have reached their limits. Simultaneously, the emergence of novel nicotine delivery systems - such as e-cigarettes, heated tobacco products, and nicotine pouches - has introduced a new dynamic. Although these products are not risk-free, they are generally associated with a significant reduction in toxicant exposure relative to conventional cigarettes. Policy responses to this technological development vary: some countries have adopted regulatory frameworks that differentiate products based on their relative health risks, while others apply uniform restrictions across all nicotine-containing products. This study analyzes the effect of these divergent regulatory frameworks on smoking prevalence across a cohort of 42 highly developed countries (Human Development Index (HDI) > 0.83). Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models controlling for development levels (measured by HDI index) and taxation levels, the findings indicate that countries adopting a differentiated, risk-proportionate policy exhibit smoking rates approximately 7 percentage points lower than those maintaining non-differentiated regulatory regimes. Furthermore, the analysis reveals that in this high-HDI cohort, differences in taxation levels alone no longer explain the variance in smoking prevalence, highlighting the importance of product substitution toward lower-risk nicotine products in sustaining progress in tobacco control.

Date: 2026
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