Revisiting behavioral merger remedies in turbulent markets: A framework for dynamic competition

Patrice Bougette, Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty

No 202, Ilmenau Economics Discussion Papers from Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics

Abstract: Digital platforms, ecosystems, and R&D-intensive sectors pose distinctive challenges for merger control. In these fast-evolving markets, shaped by technological change and shifting competitive dynamics, traditional ex-ante reviews often fall short in anticipating long-term outcomes. This paper proposes a multi-step merger control model that includes a mechanism for remedy revision, allowing authorities to adjust behavioral commitments during their implementation. By embedding structured flexibility into merger decisions, our approach enables remedies to evolve in response to market reconfigurations, strategic conduct, or regulatory insights. The framework aims to ensure that remedies remain proportionate, effective, and legally predictable. By bridging ex-ante assessment and ex-post adaptation, it offers a policy instrument better suited to the uncertainties of dynamic competition.

Keywords: Merger control; merger remedies; dynamic competition; competition policy uncertainties; innovation; digital markets; mergers & acquisitions; merger waves (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L12 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law and nep-reg
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/335044/1/1949326829.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Turbulent Markets: A Framework for Dynamic Competition (2025)
Working Paper: Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Turbulent Markets: A Framework for Dynamic Competition (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:335044

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