News media bargaining codes

Luca Sandrini and Robert Somogyi

No 24-043, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: We build a model of the news market where advertisers allocate their ads between a social media platform and a news website. Our objective is to evaluate policy interventions aimed at fostering news creation by transferring revenues from social media to news websites already introduced in Australia, Canada, and Indonesia). We show that social media may voluntarily contribute to news development, but only suboptimally. Beyond a certain level of state-mandated transfer, the social media platform can credibly threaten to remove news content. We provide some guidance on how to design a policy that improves welfare by promoting news creation.

Keywords: social media; news quality; platform regulation; news media bargaining code; online advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D62 L13 L51 M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-pay, nep-reg and nep-sea
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/300268/1/1895338719.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: News Media Bargaining Codes (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:300268

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