 Does tightening the duration of temporary contracts cost jobs? Evidence from GermanyNo 26-026, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Abstract: Many countries limit how long a worker may be kept on a temporary contract, yet little is known about how firms and workers respond when this maximum duration is tightened. Does a shorter cap simply displace temporary jobs, or does it push firms towards permanent hiring? I provide causal evidence on this duration margin using a 2001 German reform that restricted temporary contracts longer than two years in previously exempt small firms. Using difference-in-differences combined with propensity-score matching, I find that new jobs became around five percentage points more likely to start with a permanent contract, that contract durations bunched at the cap, and that overall employment was not adversely affected. Once the first capped contracts matured, turnover of short-tenure workers rose by a third to a half, but conversions to permanent contracts dominated this churn margin, and post-reform labour-market entrants saw higher early-career earnings and job stability. The findings speak directly to the current debate over lengthening such caps, including Germany's plan to double its own from two to four years. Keywords: Temporary Employment; Employment Protection; Labour Market Segmentation; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:341996 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC. |
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